Human error is a pervasive and normal part of everyday life and is of interest to the anaesthetist because errors may lead to accidents. Definitions of, and the relationships between, errors, incidents and accidents are provided as the basis to this introduction to the psychology of human error in the context of the work of the anaesthetist. Examples are drawn from the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS). An argument is put forward for the use of contemporaneous incident reporting (eliciting relevant contextual information as well as details of use to cognitive psychologists), rather than the use of accident investigation after the event (with the inherent problems of scant information, altered perception and outcome bias). A classification of errors is provided. ';4ctive" errors may be classified into knowledge-based, rule-based, skill-based and technical errors. Different strategies are required for the prevention of each type and it may now be useful to place more emphasis in anaesthetic practice on categories to which little attention has been directed in the past. "Latent" errors make an enormous contribution to problems in anaesthesia and several categories are discussed (e.g. environment, physiological state, equipment, work practices, personnel training, social and cultural factors). An approach is provided for the prevention and management of errors, incidents and accidents which allows clinical problems to be categorized, the relative importance of various contributing factors to be established, and appropriate preventative strategies to be devised and implemented on the basis of priorities determined from the AIMS data. Accidents cannot be abolished; however, an understanding of the factors underlying them can lead to the rational direction of resources and effort to prevent them and minimise their effects.
Understanding the causes of errors is a first step toward effective error management and, therefore, incident and accident prevention. The task is not a simple one, however. As Gaba has pointed out,2 the anaesthetist is part of a complex, dynamic system. This system is not only comprised of the patient, the anaesthetist, co-workers, and a complex array of equipment, but is also influenced by a host of administrative, political, and cultural factors. Discovering the genesis of errors, therefore, requires an understanding of this system on several interacting levels. Similarly, preventing errors, incidents and accidents often requires a multi-level approach. Not surprisingly, there is no single solution to the problem. However, studies of human error have shown that errors often take predictable forms, and that there are identifiable mechanisms that can help explain why they occur. 3 Thus, despite the complexity of the problem, error prevention and error management are largely feasible goals.
The whole area of error and human performance is highly "context dependent" (i.e. is profoundly influenced by the nature of the task and the circumstances and environment in which it is being under-taken). A vital first step is to have a database of incidents and accidents with sufficient detail to allow identification of mechanisms and contributing factors. The Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS) provides such a database, 4 and it will be drawn upon in this paper. Elsewhere in this symposium issue some of the concepts outlined in this paper will be applied to analysing aspects of the AIMS data.
THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM
Error researchers typically find that at least 80% of serious incidents in complex systems where humans and machines interact involve human error. Nagel 5 estimated that 90% of aviation accidents can be directly attributed to human error; "behavioural factors" have been shown to be involved in over 90070 of industrial fatalities. 6 In anaesthesia, human error rates are similarly high.4,7 Even when human error is not involved directly, it is often possible to point to errors in the design, fabrication, inspection, installation, or maintenance of some part of the system. Thus human error may also act indirectly, and in some form is almost always a contributing factor to any incident or accident.
ERRORS, INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS
A schematic representation of how goals and intentions are converted into actions is given in the top section of Figure 1 (after Norman).8 An anaesthetist will start with a goal (e.g. to induce anaesthesia). An intention is then formed (e.g. to use thiopentone), and a specific sequence of actions is planned. The plan may involve getting and checking the necessary equipment and ampoules; mixing and drawing up some thiopentone; identifying and cannulating an appropriate vein; and then injecting a suitable dose. These actions are then physically executed and the outcome compared with the intended outcome so that it can be determined if the plan was successful and the intention and the goal achieved. 8 A reasonable plan such as this will usually lead to an "acceptable" set of actions and result in an "acceptable" outcome.
An error is a "flawed" plan or action, and may be defined more specifically as when a planned sequence of mental or physical activities fails to result in an intended outcome (i.e. in an incident or an accident). 3 An incident may be defined as an unintended event or outcome which could have, or did, reduce the safety margin for the patient, and an accident as an adverse or "negative" outcome. 9 The relationships between acceptable actions, acceptable outcomes, errors, incidents and accidents are shown in Figure l. Acceptable actions leading to Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, Vol, 21, No, 5, October, 1993 acceptable outcomes, as in the thiopentone induction example given above, constitute the most common sequence of events (see Arrow 1, Figure 1 ).
Errors are also very common, especially as defined by the strictest criterion of "performance which deviates from the ideal"; errors lead to incidents or accidents. An example of an error leading to an incident would be injecting 5070 rather than 2.5070 thiopentone, but without any ensuing tissue damage (see arrow 2, Figure 1 ). Note that this outcome is not "acceptable" by our definition, although no harm resulted, because the safety margin for the patient was reduced. Errors may also lead to accidents (see arrow 3, Figure 1 ). An example of an error leading to an accident would be injecting 5070 thiopentone into an artery, with pain and ischaemic sequelae.
Acceptable actions do sometimes lead to incidents (e.g. injection of a normal dose of 2.5070 thiopentone resulting in moderate hypotension which resolves within a minute (see arrow 4, Figure 1 ), and, more rarely, to accidents, (e.g. injection of thiopentone leading to anaphylaxis) (see arrow 5, Figure 1 ). "Chance" may play a role at any level and may on its own occasionally result in an incident or accident (see arrows 6 and 7, in Figure 1 ). An example of a chance event would be when during induction of anaesthesia the operating table collapses due to the failure of a component which could not reasonably have been predicted by a maintenance engineer. If the patient is immediately secured, and prevented from falling, this would constitute an incident ensuing from a chance event. If the patient rolled onto the floor and required sutures for a cut on the head, this would constitute an accident arising from a chance event.
It is accepted that, colloquially, the term "accident" may be used to mean any unintended outcome and that an outcome from which no actual harm resulted may be deemed "acceptable", but for the purposes of this and future discussions by our group about human performance in anaesthetic practice, the definitions cited above of "acceptable outcome", "error", "incident" and "accident" will be used and the relationships between them displayed in Figure 1 will be implied. It is also accepted that the boundaries between each outcome category are open to debate as are those between "acceptable action", "error" and "chance event' '.
ERRORS, ACCIDENTS AND BLAME
It is important to accept that not all accidents are caused by error and that even when they are, not all errors are culpable. After an accident the question often becomes not one of whether a different course of action could or should have been followed, but rather whether that person can be held legally responsible. The word "error" often carries negative connotations and becomes bound with the concept of blame, rather than simply representing any aspect of performance which, with hindsight, deviated from the ideal. Errors are often deemed culpable only with the "wisdom" of hindsight when they have resulted in an accident. The intentions <'.nd plans made may in fact have been entirely reasonable in prospect, given the information available at the time and the time-frame in which the decisions had to be made. Furthermore, a number of 
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contributing factors (see below) and chance events may have conspired together to cause an accident resulting from what, under only slightly different circumstances, would have been a benign incident. Most anaesthetists have attended a "morbidity and mortality" meeting at which standards and degrees of insight are applied retrospectively by certain participants which the others present would deem unrealistic in the context in which the problem actually occurred. This tendency to apportion "blame" when there has been an adverse outcome has even been shown to occur with "impartial" experts who are well-removed from the events. 10 Also, our legal system all too often seems to be influenced by outcome rather than judging purely how reasonable an action mayor may not have been in a particular context.
We agree with Allnutt I that errors constitute an inevitable subset within the normal range of human performance and that culpability should be reserved only for extreme departures from acceptable practice when there are no extenuating circumstances. Some simple "slips" can have disastrous consequences and some terrible accidents may not have occurred had a human behaved perfectly. However, all too often perfect behaviour may quite unreasonably be expected, retrospectively, when in fact such a level of performance may be virtually impossible to achieve in the context of a dramatic, rapidly evolving emergency. To state that an aircraft accident was largely due to "human error" is reasonable. However, to hold the pilot personally responsible for the deaths of many people implies culpability, when in fact he or she may have performed in a most difficult and demanding crisis in a reasonable but less than perfect manner. Moreover, in over a third of cases the "prime cause" may have been a "contributing factor" (e.g. a potentially confusing instrument display or design fault). II The psychology of error does not seek to assign blame or responsibility but rather seeks to establish causal factors and systematicities in exhibited behaviour. Once established, these may be amenable to manipulation and modification. The AIMS study has no interest at all in culpability; this approach encourages frank and full reporting of incidents and accidents.
ACCIDENT PREDICTION OR ERROR ANALYSIS?
Careful examination of accident reports (in transportation, the nuclear power industry, aviation or anaesthesia) shows that accidents are often the products of unlikely coincidences. 1, 3, 12 MUltiple factors usually are involved; some independent of each other, and others coupled. Furthermore, sometimes no single human action leading up to an accident can be called an error per se, except in the sense that, in retrospect, had the action been performed differently, the accident would riot have occurred. To put this another way, retrospectively, all accidents have "causes". 13 However, it is characteristic of accidents that few accidents can be predicted from independent consideration of their "causes". Because of the unpredictable nature of accidents, preventing future accidents directly from attempted retrospective analyses of past accidents is a difficult task.
At least three factors mitigate against the process of accident investigation. Firstly, memory of the events has been shown to degrade rapidly and to default and be distorted in the directions of simplicity and coherence. Thus, not what happened, but what must have happened is reported. 1,6 Secondly, those involved in accidents involving patients are taught, for medicolegal reasons, to record only bare observable facts, and to refrain from recording any detailed information of interest to the cognitive psychologist. Thus it is often difficult to obtain the necessary details from records. I' Thirdly, particularly after serious accidents, investigators have their own theories and prejudices which may influence their findings I; the powerful influence of "outcome bias" has already been commented upon. 10 It is preferable to ask people to record incidents in detail as soon as possible after they have occurred. As AIMS reports are anonymous they can and do include a wealth of detail which would never be included in an accident report. As there is no serious outcome arising from the great majority of reported incidents, some of the problems outlined above are avoided. From such reports a detailed catalogue of human error may be generated.
It is far easier to predict and prevent errors, rather than accidents, as errors, to a large extent, are systematic. Many errors take on predictable forms, and are expressed in known ways. Systems can be designed to minimize contributing and precipitating factors, and to help detect and absorb the effects of errors. Because most accidents do involve error, we can be confident that error prevention and management will go a significant way towards the prevention of accidents.
CLASSIFICATION OF ERRORS
The fundamental problem with determining the relative frequencies of different kinds of errors is in defining the various categories; we will divide errors into two major categories, "active" and "latent". Active errors are usually immediate precursors to an incident or accident, whereas latent errors may occur well before the time of an accident (e.g. placing a "wrong" ampoule in a container of similar "right" ampoules).
Active Errors
A widely accepted view is that errors are a natural cost of a human information processing system that has evolved for both efficiency and adaptivity. )1' Indeed, the study of errors provides insight into cognitive mechanisms which operate at various levels to produce the full spectrum of human behaviour from memory to planning, the execution of actions, perceptual processes and the evaluation of outcome. There are three major taxonomic forms of active errors: contextual, modal, and psychological. Each will be dealt with briefly, before a more detailed consideration of a psychological classification.
(I) Contextual
One way of describing errors is by consideration of the details of how errors are expressed. This kind of taxonomy is completely context-dependent in that it describes errors in terms of which particular actions were performed in which particular environment. To say that an anaesthetist administered 1 mg of adrenaline when 2.5 mg of neostigmine was intended is to describe the error using contextual details. Using a contextual level of classification, one might then attempt to find out how many times this particular error involving adrenaline and neostigmine, or other drugs, had occurred.
A contextual taxonomy does not generalize across work places and thus is not a predictive account of errors in general but rather a descriptive account of what may happen doing particular tasks in a particular type of workplace. Such a taxonomy may on its own fail to reveal underlying similarities among errors which may be expressed very differently, but which may have similar basic causes. AIMS not only constitutes a set of contextual descriptions of incidents, but also solicits information about contributing factors and factors which may have minimized an adverse outcome.
(2) Modal
A second way of describing errors is by using a generic, context-free phenomenological classification, sometimes called the "mode" of an error. In Errors are categorized as omissions, repetitions, substitutions and insertions of actions, for example. In the adrenaline/ neostigmine case cited above the error might be called an error of "substitution" according to a modal taxonomy.
Modal taxonomies are generalizable in the sense that we expect errors of omission, insertion, substitution and repetition to occur in all complex systems. One can, therefore, accumulate data from diverse environments and calculate error probabilities. Some data suggest that substitution errors are the most frequent kind. 17 However substitutions can take many forms, from the mistyping of a letter in a word to the formulation of the wrong plan. Because the mode of an error does not tell us exactly how an error will manifest itself, knowing the probability of substitution, for example, is not of much practical use. Also, because a modal taxonomy does not tell us anything about why such errors occur, it does little to inform about error prevention strategies. Hence this classification will not be considered further.
(3) Psychological
In this form the analyst attempts to make inferences about the underlying internal mechanisms giving rise to the error. This kind of taxonomy attempts to describe where in the chain of internal events an error occurred, and why it occurred. To again take the example of the adrenaline-neostigmine' 'swap", when it became evident from the AIMS report that both ampoules were identical in colour and size, and that the anaesthetist was teaching a group of medical students at the time, a classification of the error as a "slip" would be reasonable (i.e. the error was due to failure to monitor routine actions because limited cognitive resources were being diverted to teaching (see below for a further consideration of "slips").
Theoretically, psychological taxonomies are both predictive and generalizable. Given that we can say something about the internal mechanisms involved in causing the error, we can also suggest ways in which that kind of error can be prevented. Thus, although it is often difficult to infer the internal events from observable behaviour, making psychological taxonomies difficult to formulate, validate and use, a psychological approach does have the potential to provide sufficient insight to allow the development of useful error prevention strategies.
An example of a broad psychological classification is Norman's slip/mistake distinction. 18 Put simply, Norman refers to "slips" as actions not intended, while "mistakes" are due to poorly formed intentions. Reason J has argued that it is more useful to consider at least three broad categories: knowledge-based mistakes, rule-based mistakes and skill-based slips and lapses. This distinction expands on a conceptual framework originally put forth by Rasmussen. 15 A slightly expanded and modified version is proposed in Figure 2 to provide the basis for a classification for /lnaesthesia and ifllensi\'e Care, V()/. 21, /"0. 5, Octo her, 1993 use in analyzing the AIMS data. To simplify matters, only the term "error" has been used where some authors use the term "mistake". Knowledge-based errors: Knowledge based errors are a result of forming the wrong intention or making the wrong plan, and are due to inadequate knowledge or experience. An example of an inappropriate intention due to inadequate knowledge would be if an anaesthetist used a large dose of propofol to induce anaesthesia in a patient with aortic stenosis in the (erroneous) belief that propofol does not depress the myocardium or lower the blood pressure. An example of a "wrong plan" would be setting incorrect alarm limits on a new "menu driven" monitor because the anaesthetist was trying to work out the procedure empirically.
Of the first 2000 AIMS incidents error of judgement, inexperience and unfamiliar equipment or environment were cited as contributing factors in 16, II and 4070 respectively, and prior experience or awareness as a factor minimizing outcome in 35%.4 Thus knowledge, experience and familiarity were deemed important factors in a positive sense in 35% and in a negative sense in 26% of all reported incidents (some reporters cited more than one negative contributing factor).
Rule-based errors: These are errors which involve the failure to apply a rule designed to avoid error or minimize adverse outcome, to apply a bad or inadequate rule, or to misapply a rule in some problemsolving situation. An example of the first kind would be failure to check equipment before starting a procedure, and of the second kind would be the use of an inadequate checking procedure. An example of the third kind would be if an anaesthetist instituted a cardiopulmonary resuscitation routine for a "cardiac arrest" without realizing that an ECG lead had become disconnected.
Failure to check equipment was cited in 13% of the first 2000 AIMS incidents and inadequate preoperative assessment of the patient in 7%. Elsewhere in this issue it is reported that for 13% of incidents, correct application of a proposed crisis management algorithm would have led to a quicker and/or better resolution of the problem. 19 This represents a further 13% which could be regarded as "rule-based" errors in that the anaesthetists involved used their own rules, which, in retrospect, were inadequate or inappropriate for solving those particular problems. For example, the problem may have been hypotension due to a vaporizer being inadvertently left on from the previous case. That anaesthetist's problem-solving rule did not include always checking the vaporizer, whereas the proposed algorithm does. Thus rule-based errors contribute in at least one fifth and possibly in as much as one third of all cases.
Skill-based errors (slips and lapses): Slips and lapses refer to errors which are the result of "absentmindedness"; activities at which an operator is skilled are prone to these errors. Many slips can be understood to be the result of a temporary dissociation between two control modes for human action: the automatic control mode and conscious control mode. 8 These two control systems are fundamentally different in nature. The automatic control system consists of stored action patterns which can be executed with very little attention. This system is fast, efficient, and rigid, drawing on habitual action sequences, and operating with relatively little need to monitor the environment. This is the "autopilot" system which develops with skill. The conscious control system, on the other hand, comes into play in novel situations and is heavily dependent on limited cognitive resources. Control of actions is more flexible and powerful, but it is also selective, serial, conscious, slow and effortful. The role of the conscious control system is, in part, to monitor the progress of the automatic system, and to check to see that actions do not deviate from "higher level" plans.
There are both benefits and costs to such a dualcontrol system. On the one hand, the ability to perform complex actions virtually "attention-free" is good as it means that attentional resources can be freed up to apply to other problems (e.g. driving to work on "autopilot" whilst working out a strategy for solving a complex problem). Indeed, highly skilled people have a large repertoire of activities that can be carried out at this level. On the other hand we must expect that, every now and then, failure to monitor actions will result in some actions being executed which were not intended. It appears that people perform a subconscious pattern matching on the environment, seeking the appropriate "trigger conditions" for welllearned responses. When particularly absent-minded, the perceived situation need only loosely match the conditions for an action sequence to be triggered and a slip occurs. A class of slips which Norman 18 has called "description errors" exhibit this tendency. In description errors, the correct actions become performed on the wrong objects. In other words, the objects to be acted upon are only loosely "described" by the action plan.
At least half of all ampoule errors and syringe swaps appear to be description errors, where the item intended to be selected is similar to that which is actually selected. 20 There is no doubt that certain practices in anaesthesia are particularly prone to error due to a failure to monitor routine actions. In the AIMS study it was found, for example, that inattention was cited as a contributing factor in over 40070 of the reported incidents of errors involving wrong drugs, whereas it was cited in only 12070 of all incidents. Similarly, fatigue was four times more commonly associated with "wrong drug" errors than all incidents. 20 An example of a slip would be if an anaesthetist injects suxamethonium instead of fentanyl before induction of anaesthesia from a correctly labelled but same-sized syringe. An example of a lapse would be if an anaesthetist is asked to give the patient 5000IU of heparin during a case, but is distracted after drawing it up and forgets to give it. The vast majority of the 144 "wrong drug" errors in the first 2000 AIMS incidents were slips. Also, some failures to check and therefore detect an evolving problem can be classified as lapses. Overall it is estimated that at least 10070 of AIMS incidents arise from slips or lapses.
Technical errors: These arise when an outcome fails to occur or the wrong outcome is produced because the execution of an action was imperfect. An example of the former would be if an anaesthetist inserts an epidural catheter but no block ensues, presumably because the tip was not successfully placed in the epidural space. An example of the latter would be if an anaesthetist performs an epidural block and gets a spinal tap. These errors would, classically, be placed into the "knowledge-based" or "rule-based" categories, but because they provide an identifiable group to anaesthetists, they have been placed in a separate category. However, most are different in that the plan and choice of technique was appropriate, appropriate rules were correctly followed, no slip or lapse was involved, but no outcome or a bad outcome resulted. In a sense, these are not errors at all because underspecification of the task (e.g. abnormal anatomy of the patient) is not always detectable or correctable by the anaesthetist. Certainly, they are not errors in which culpability should be implied. It may be useful to classify these separately because problems with particular techniques can be catalogued and some useful recommendations may be possible when sufficient information has accumulated. "Fault of technique" was cited as a contributing factor in 13070 of the first 2000 AIMS incidents.
Latent Errors and Contributing or "Shaping" Factors
Errors are not only a function of knowledge "in the head" (of stored patterns, plans, and skills) but are also heavily influenced by the physical and cultural environment and by cues. 8 People rely on the constraints and affordances of objects and processes in the external world to provide cues about which actions are permissible and also to trigger actions. As has been alluded to above, anaesthetists make plans and execute actions in a highly complex system in a distracting, cluttered environment on a time scale which is sometimes not of their choosing. There are many "shaping factors" which influence these plans and actions; some of these may result in sequences which are, for example, expeditious, but which may be more error prone and risky than a safer but slower alternative. Table  I . Examples of latent errors will be given which are embedded in the shaping factors listed below; anyone of them might exert an influence at an inopportune moment, and may turn out to be an essential antecedent or important part of a cascade of events culminating in an accident. Indeed, a latent error or contributing factor was considered to be the "prime cause" in over 35070 of 1020 fatalities in industry. 6.11 Task requirements. The perceptual-motor and cognitive skills required for a task influence the type of error and its frequency. For example, tasks which involve long periods of sustained vigilance punctuated by periods of high workload tend to be highly susceptible to error. An example would be monitoring for air embolism with a precordial stethoscope. It is difficult to remain vigilant for long periods of time, and to suddenly change from a passive to a very active Anll£>.Hhesia and In/l'nsive Care, ~()I. 21, /\'u. 5, Ocrober, 1993 role when this long period of vigilance is suddenly interrupted by the need for urgent resuscitative measures ("day-dream to panic"). 1 Another inherent problem which increases the cognitive task requirements of the anaesthetist is that some cues are very non-specific but do draw attention to the fact that something may be going wrong in the complex patient-machine-surgeon system. For example tachycardia may have many causes, e.g. hypoxia, hypercarbia, surgical stimulus, awareness, hypovolaemia, incipient malignant hyperthermia, or mechanical stimulation of the heart by a central venous catheter, to list but a few. The limited human cognitive resource is quite inadequate to tackle this problem from first principles, and indeed may fail to prevent an adverse outcome from some obscure cause, even when "calling up" conceptual schemata which address diagnostic aspects of the problem and invoking preformed rules for trying to deal with these. Such problems may need a properly validated crisis management algorithm. 19 Analysis of AIMS data reveals that some obscure or complex problems need to be solved in such a way, backed up by "sub-algorithm" checklists, as prioritizing diagnostic and therapeutic options is a very demanding task, and becomes more difficult as a crisis escalates and the patient's condition deteriorates. 21 Physiological state. The physiological state of the anaesthetist may have a significant effect on the number of errors committed. Fatigue caused by overwork is one source of error relevant to anaesthesia. 2, 22 Fatigue may selectively increase the incidence of certain types of error. For example, fatigue was reported as a contributing factor in 12070 of 144 "wrong drug" incidents, which were mainly "slip/lapse" errors, but in only 3% of the 2000 incidents of which these incidents were a subset. 20 The relationship of job and concurrent domestic stress to error-proneness is also significant, and has been well documented. 1. 23 Design of equipment. Much equipment is simply poorly designed. For example, 9 of 13 ventilator "disconnect" alarms evaluated had no battery backup or power failure alarm; 24 thus, a paralyzed patient could suffer hypoxic brain damage simply due to local power failure.
Difficulty in discriminating audio information sources may also be a problem when for example, frequent false-alarms of a low risk state sound similar to a rare but very dangerous state. In one AIMS report, the anaesthetist turned the oxygen off and nitrous oxide "up" at the end of a case, and did not respond immediately to the ensuing "low oxygen" alarm because it was identical to the (expected) "high oxygen" alarm.
Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, Vol, 21, No, 5, October, 1993 A lack of "limiting functions" (or built-in blocks to dangerous actions) is quite often a contributing factor to accidents. An example from the AIMS study cited in several reports is that in Australia the scavenging tube from the circle system can be connected at its distal end to the scavenging outlet of a ventilator, leading to a dangerous "over-pressure" situation in the patient breathing circuit. 25 Clusters of incidents in the AIMS study may identify previously unrecognized sources of error. For example, a new ventilator incorporated a "standby mode" as an additional feature which, for activities such as taking X-rays during surgical procedures, inactivated it and disabled alarms. Eight incidents were reported soon after these ventilators were introduced in which the ventilator was put in the standby mode for an X-ray or a posture change and then was not switched back to normal ventilation mode for a considerable time.
Equipment design improvement was cited as a corrective strategy in 17% of the first 2000 AIMS incidents, and ranked second only to equipment checking discipline in this category.
Workspace layout and conditions. The workspace may be so arranged that access to controls is limited. For example, the emergency oxygen "flush" button cannot be activated by an anaesthetist who requires both hands to maintain an airway if the "lock on" facility has been removed. This has been removed in many hospitals to avoid it inadvertently being left on during a case, so avoiding unintended dilution of anaesthetic gases and potential "awareness" of the patient. This advantage must be traded off against the disadvantage cited above.
Limited access to information can also be a problem. Some workspaces require people to monitor a 360 degree field of view. If the view of the patient is obstructed, the situation is akin to instrument-only flying; this is commonplace with neurosurgery, with most procedures involving the head and neck, and with many organ-imaging procedures. 26 Poor lighting, clutter and noise are other workspace/environmental factors which can contribute to errors. Improved environment was cited as a suggested corrective strategy in 2.3070 of the first 2000 AIMS incidents. 4 Product design. Poor labelling and packaging is a common source of medication errors. 27 Often the brand name is displayed more prominently than the generic name of the drug so that products look or feel the same and are easily confused. "Similarity" was a problem in half of all ampoule and half of all syringe errors; several corrective strategies have been suggested in a companion paper. 20 Other examples of poor product design which have led to problems documented many times by AIMS w. B. RUNC1MAN ET AL. include connections that easily disconnect, valves in circle systems that stick, rotameter controls that are easily "bumped" and inadvertently adjusted, and ventilators and monitors that simply cease to function without indicating that they have failed. An example of a fatal incident arising from an obvious "latent error" in design was when the "sharp" end of a Seldinger wire perforated the aorta; this led to only wires with two "floppy" ends being purchased by that institution.
Training of personnel. Much of what constitutes
expertise is knowing the right "rule of thumb" in a particular situation, including "troubleshooting" procedures and knowing what to do in an emergency. Much of this knowledge is not available in textbooks but is acquired by practical experience. Little systematic attention has been given to active "training" in clinical anaesthesia other than "learning on the job"; most has been directed towards education. Training personnel how to handle specific crises has been shown to be very effective, as thinking from first principles in an emergency invariably results in cognitive overload. Furthermore, unusual problems tend to be dealt with badly by people trying to think from first principles in emergency situations. "" Additional training and specific protocol development were cited as suggested corrective strategies in 11 and 10070 of the first 2000 AIMS incidents, respectively.
Workplace policies/procedures. Inconsistencies in workspace layout, equipment, procedures and policies across work places can account for some errors. In a recent survey in a teaching hospital, it was found that the layout of drugs for emergency use was quite different even in adjacent operating theatres; this is clearly likely to be conducive to "ampoule errors ". 20 Financial constraints have meant that equipment will be of different ages, and equipment performing the same task may be quite different in different locations in the same hospital.
Assistance and Supervision. Policy and procedural factors will determine whether or not there are adequate experienced personnel to handle emergencies, and to properly coordinate breaks. Inadequate assistance was cited as a contributing factor in 3070 of the first 2000 AIMS incidents and skilled assistance and supervision as factors minimising adverse outcome in 12 and 9070, respectively. 25 Social/cultural factors. Both in aviation and in medicine, there are reports of people who commit errors because they are both overconfident and reluctant to seek help. ' ox More often than not, these are senior people who perceive they have a reputation to uphold and thus will pursue more risky courses of action. Subordinates, reluctant to assert themselves, may exacerbate this kind of incident further.
In one AIMS report a medical student noticed that the consultant anaesthetist had accidently supplied the patient with 100070 nitrous oxide at the end of a case instead of 100070 oxygen, but suppressed his desire to point this out until the patient was obviously cyanosed.
Multi-person factors. Most work is not done in isolation but involves other people with access to different kinds of information, who possess different kinds of knowledge and expertise, and who may have conflicting goals. There are certain benefits of work distribution. People can apply their particular expertise to a problem so that the workload is efficiently distributed. However, distribution of work and expertise can lead to communication and co-ordination problems, power struggles, and difficulties if one person has to take over from another. An important task may be left undone because each thought the other would do it. In a recent report blood crossmatched for another patient was given because a consultant believed (incorrectly) that it was the task of the nurse handing him the blood to check that it was the correct unit.
A very c.,.nmon subset of "multi-person factors" is a communication problem. Several problems were documented because vital information elicited by an anaesthetist at a preoperative visit was not passed on to the anaesthetist who ultimately administered the anaesthetic. Improved communication was cited as a suggested corrective strategy in just under 10070 of the first 2000 AIMS incidents.
Chance. The influence of "chance", frequently interacting with several minor, slightly unusual but "acceptable" circumstances, may lead to an incident or accident. In 20070 of the first 2000 AIMS incidents no contributing factor was cited by the reporter, and in most of these no such factor could be identified by review of the reports. An example is the sudden fracture of a component of a valve, or a properly maintained ventilator suddenly ceasing to function. It is important to note that systems designed to monitor and confirm that the equipment and patient are proceeding "on course" will pick up evolving incidents and accidents arising in this way just as effectively as if they arose from an error.
PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT OF ERRORS, INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS
An outline of an error, incident and accident prevention and management process is given in Figure  3 . Each stage will be considered in turn.
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Finding Out What is Going On
The various ways of finding out what is going on are listed in Table 2 . Historically, retrospective mortality reviews 29·]4 and mortality and morbidity committee reviews J5 ·]6 have provided the bulk of the useful information. However, as the incidence of serious injury and death has declined this approach has diminished in power, although it has been and will continue to be important. Other problems with "back tracking" after accidents have been alluded to earlier in this paper. Reports from medical defence organisations 37 and "closed claims" studies 14, [38] [39] [40] also provide much useful information, but suffer from the same problems as mortality and morbidity studies.
Hazard alerts, such as those from the Emergency Care Research Institute (Philadelphia, USA) and the Therapeutic Device Evaluation Committee in Australia provide information relating specifically to equipment failure. However, getting this information to the practising anaesthetist is not easy. Anecdotes and experience, backed up by literature reviews and case reports, are also important ways of becoming aware of potential problems.
Studies based on direct observation of practising anaesthetists may provide much information and an estimate of error frequency. However, this method is extremely labour intensive as well as intrusive, and the reason for some of the errors may be difficult to assess. In a direct observational study by Henderson and Galletly (personal communication), an average of nearly two "anaesthesia system" or procedural errors was detailed per case, three-quarters of which were made by the anaesthetist. Interestingly, 6070 involved failure of preoperative assessment and 14% were problems with equipment -percentages virtually identical to those in the "failure to check" category in the AIMS study. Consultants made more than twice as many errors as trainees, and the vast majority were "rule-based" and involved taking short cuts (application of inadequate rules). In fact, in this study they were called "intentional errors" by the authors. Conscious failure to apply a good rule is termed a "violation" by Reason. 3 Another approach is to observe errors in simulation studies. Several simulations of operating rooms have already yielded useful information. 2 Although these are also fairly costly and time consuming, it is likely that they will become increasingly used as sophisticated simulators become commercially available in the near future. 41 Anonymous incident reporting is described in detail elsewhere in this symposium issue, with many examples of the sort of information that may be gleaned from it. Advantages are that it is relatively cheap, is potentially universally applicable, is medico-legally safe an~ may elicit a large volume of relevant, specific infdrmation. It may also satisfy the "desire to confess" which we all experience after having caused some harm to a patient. A major disadvantage is that this approach does not provide a denominator, so that the absolute incidence of a particular type of problem can not be assessed. However, studies determining the absolute incidence of any event are very expensive, and few comprehensive studies have been successfully done. A more practical useful approach is to design and carry out prospective studies on specific problems identified from incident monitoring. 42 Nevertheless, a great deal of detailed information about the qualitative nature of what is happening can be gained from incident monitoring, and this is perfectly adequate to design both prospective studies and preventative strategies. 42 Each of the approaches listed in Table 2 have their own advantages and disadvantages; they should be regarded as complementary rather than mutually exclusive.
Collating the Information
The next step is to collate the information and collect subsets for study and classification (Figure 3) . This involves forming a project team and having access to the relevant information. Examples of such teams are confidential morbidity and/or mortality review committees, closed claim study groups, the AIMS teams of analysts, or any group in a department charged with addressing a particular problem. 43 These will usually concentrate on a particular set of data but will consider their findings in the light of additional information from the other sources listed in Table 2 .
Categorizing Problems, Contributing Factors and Errors
Firstly, the problems should be classified into groups. An example of such a classification of the problems ("clinical situations") which occurred in association with general anaesthesia is provided in a paper in this LATENT Table 4 , p. 516). 43 The next step is to categorise the contributing factors and errors. Information of relevance to these was "mixed-up" in the empirically designed AIMS reporting forms used for the analyses in this symposium. A summary of the relevant information extracted from the first 2000 incidents reported to AIMS using this reporting form is presented in Figure 4 . However, such an overall summary is of limited value in devising preventative strategies for particular problems.
A framework is required for apportioning the various contributing factors (latent errors), behavioural factors (active errors) and chance to individual problems or to each category of problem. A knowledge of the relative frequency of occurrence of the most important contributing factors and of the potential impact of each problem will allow appropriate preventive strategies to be devised, and will facilitate the setting of priorities.
Such a framework is depicted in Figure 5 . This is based on a classification of the factors which contributed to over 1000 fatalities in industry. 11 It allows all the factors identified in this present paper and in a number of studies in both anaesthesia and industry to be incorporated. 4.'.7.44 It is planned to design a new AIMS reporting form so as to elicit information of relevance to these categories using "natural mapping" methods. 8 
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FIGURE 5: An example of how this format may have been used for a case of severe hypotension due to a vaporiser being inadvertently left on: 2. The hospital uses a "Selectatec system" and there were two vaporisers on the back bar. 4. Someone had left or turned a vaporizer on. 25. The anaesthetist made a rule-based error at the beginning of the case by carrying out only a cursory check of the system. 32. The use of a pulse oximeter alerted the anaesthetist as the pulse signal disappeared. 33. Good crisis management by the second anaesthetist who came to help solve the problem. An example of how this form may have been filled in for a case of oesophageal intubation: 2. Capnograph not available for that theatre (being repaired).
3. There was no policy that an elective case would not proceed in the absence of a capnograph. 25. A technical error was made (undetected oesophageal intubation). 32. A pulse oximeter alerted the anaesthetist. 33 . The fact that the anaesthetist had been taught good crisis management helped. each type of problem either by the reporter or by an analyst, and appropriate software would allow suitably processed information to be fed back rapidly to reporting institutions.
Developing Preventative Strategies
Armed with this information it is then possible to develop strategies for preventing, detecting and/or minimising the consequences of problems (see Figure  5 ). For example severe hypotension due to a vaporizer being inadvertently left on would be categorized as being due largely to a rule-based error (failure to check) and the most appropriate strategies would be to put both improved pre-anaesthetic check lists and good crisis management algorithms into place. 19.21 A group of cases of oesophageal intubation would be classified as being due to "technical error" and a simple strategy to prevent adverse outcome could be a requirement that placement of the endotracheal tube in the trachea always be confirmed by expired air capnography.28 For other problems there may be a complex set of contributing factors, and preventive strategies may need to be developed at several levels. 20 Once preventative strategies have been devised for a particular problem it may be necessary to carry out explicit risk-benefit analysis to justify the arguments for obtaining the necessary resources to solve the problem. 40 Such an analysis was carried out, for example, to justify the purchase of "low pressure" disconnect alarms. 45 
Putting Strategies Into Place
Strategies must be practical if they are to be implemented. A recommendation that comprehensive gas analysers be supplied for every anaesthetic machine to prevent inadvertent vapour overdose, would, for example, not be practical in Australia at present. To do so by enforcing the use of an explicit check list before starting each anaesthetic might also be a rational approach, but may be too difficult to implement at this stage, whereas a requirement for each staff member to have a brief annual evaluation of their ability to carry out a simple crisis management algorithm may be the most practical approach.
On the other hand, the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists has paved the way for the complete prevention of any sequelae of oesophageal intubation with their recommendation that a capnograph be exclusively available for every intubated and ventilated patient. 46 However, there is still a considerable onus on individual anaesthetists and on groups of anaesthetists to ensure that the equipment has been obtained, that it is properly maintained, and that it is available, calibrated and always correctly used. Evidence presented elsewhere in this symposium indicates that considerable attention needs to be directed to education about the correct use and interpretation of monitors such as oxygen analysers and capnographs. 47A8 In other instances a general warning may be all that is warranted. For example, automated indirect blood pressure monitors are widely used but represent one of the devices which may give actively misleading information which, if accepted at face value, can lead to patient harm. 49 In this instance, AIMS subscribers were alerted in a newsletter; subsequent AIMS reports have cited the "awareness" provided by this communication as a factor minimizing outcome in similar subsequent incidents.
Assessing if the Strategies are Working
A very important but difficult step is to try to assess whether these strategies are being successful. If adverse consequences from unsuspected oesophageal intubation were never again recorded in an incident report when capnography was used, this would constitute strong but not absolute evidence that this strategy was proving effective. In the case of trying to determine whether any impact has been made on the "wrong drug" problem a carefully designed multi-centre study will need to be carried out, probably over several years. Such a study is now being planned.
CONCLUSIONS
The anaesthetist is part of a complex system which is influenced by many variables. It is inevitable that certain combinations of circumstances will combine to result in accidents. Because of the direct cause and effect relationship of the actions of an anaesthetist and such an outcome, anaesthetists are highly motivated to avoid incidents and accidents. In this paper an attempt has been made to provide an introduction to the psychology of human error in the context of anaesthesia, drawing on examples from the AIMS data.
It is important for it to be accepted that both incidents and accidents may arise not only from errors, but also from normal actions and from chance events.
Although about 80070 of incidents and accidents do involve human error, in many cases system-based problems set the scene for errors becoming accidents, and in only a fraction of these should the anaesthetist be regarded as culpable in the legal sense. On the other hand, the AIMS study has also identified many areas where improved work practices can eliminate or greatly reduce certain types of incidents and accidents (e.g. by the use of check lists and crisis management protocols). It has also identified many "latent errors" which may be addressed, for example, by improvement in equipment design.
It is our intention to systematically analyse classes of anaesthetic incidents from AIMS, to identify sources of latent errors, to classify and try to gain insight into mechanisms of active errors, and to examine the relative frequencies and efficacies of the means used for detecting and minimizing the outcome of errors. We intend to produce a series of papers outlining and discussing the AIMS data from the perspective outlined in this paper, and, building on general psychological knowledge about human performance and error, attempt to make reasonable recommendations to try to reduce the frequency and severity of the incidents and accidents that have been shown to be an intrinsic part of anaesthetic practice.
